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Ethics 2000: What Might Have Been
STEVEN C. KRANE*
With great fanfare, the American Bar Association ("ABA") announced
in 1997 that a Commission was being formed to undertake the first
comprehensive review in nearly 20 years of the rules governing the
professional conduct of lawyers. It appeared that, having produced the ABA
Canonsof ProfessionalEthics in 1908, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969, the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct in 1983,
and having amended each of those works from time to time in the intervening
years, the ABA was ready to develop a regulatory scheme that would be more
reflective of "developments in the legal profession and society .... ."' ABA
President Jerome J. Shestack, who created the Commission, expressed his
"hope that the committee will not just examine our rules of conduct but help
bring us to a higher moral ground ....
Ethics is not a system to look for
loopholes or ways out but a system of right conduct that is part of the calling
of a profession that I regard as a noble and learned profession." 2
Observers were led to believe that the members of the Commission, all
of whom are distinguished members of the bar and nationally renowned
experts on ethical issues, would take an expansive look at the fundamental
nature of the rules governing attorney conduct - if not the fundamental
nature of attorney regulation itself - and with the benefit of heightened
perspective, and an attempt at "futuring," create a framework for attorney
conduct that would not only be reflective of the realities of the practice of law
today, but that would be sufficiently progressive to provide a workable
structure to govern the legal profession well into the next century.
The possibilities were limitless. With the combined imagination and
expertise of the members of the Commission, a thorough reexamination of
these matters could lead anywhere. That, however, was not to be. Early on,
it became apparent that the Commission, dubbed "Ethics 2000," did not intend
to do more than tinker with the existing platform provided by the Model Rules
*
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1. Robert A. Stein, Updatingour Ethics Rules, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 106.
2.
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of Professional Conduct. The expressed attitude of the Commission was "if
it ain't broke, don't fix it." 3 As a result, what is emerging from the
Commission is not a proposed regulatory scheme for the next century, but
merely an updating of the existing set of Model Rules, driven to a great extent
by the view that the substance of the American Law Institute's recently
completed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers should be imported
4
into the Rules.
The Model Rules have been adopted by more than four-fifths of the
disciplinary jurisdictions in the United States in the 16 years since their
approval by the ABA House of Delegates. 5 Although the Model Rules are the
direct lineal descendants of the Canons of Professional Ethics and the threetiered Model Code of Professional Responsibility, their ancestry can be traced
back to the mid-1800s. George Sharswood's celebrated Essay on Professional
Ethics, published in 1854, is generally viewed as the first serious attempt at
synthesizing the axiomatic norms governing the conduct of American
lawyers. To Sharswood, the lawyer's paramount duty was to the client.'
While expressing the view that lawyers also have certain responsibilities to
courts, other lawyers and society, Sharswood declared that lawyers are not
responsible for the social utility of their client's cause Prudence, restraint,
civility and fairness were Sharswood's watch cries.' These principles found
their way virtually intact into the Canons of Professional Ethics, developed by
a small committee of the ABA elite. Designed in large part for the upper
echelons of the already stratified legal profession, the Canons prohibited
advertising and all forms of solicitation, thereby impinging on the ability of
working-class lawyers with working-class clients to make their presence
known or to educate potential clients as to their need for legal services. The
Canons permitted contingent fees, however, in a striking divergence from

3. See, e.g., Minutes of Ethics 2000 Commission, Part VI (Oct. 17-18, 1997);
Minutes of Ethics 2000 Commission, Part V (Sept. 27-28, 1998) ("The Commission agreed
unanimously that as an operating principle it would follow a presumptive rule of making no
change unless it is substantively necessary.") available at <http://www.abanet.orglcprl
e2kmin998.html>.

4. See, e.g., Ritchenya A. Shepard, Law of Lawyering New ALl Restatement for
July 1998,
Attorneys Could Affect MalpracticeLiability, ABA Model Ethics Code, A.B.A. J.,

at 30.

5. See generally Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-49 (1997).

CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs §2.6.2, at 53 and n.20 (1986).
See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854), reprinted
in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1907).
6.

7.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 75.
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Sharswood, who viewed them as tending to "corrupt and degrade the character
of the profession."" °
Over 50 years passed before efforts began to replace the Canons with a
more modem code of conduct. By the 1960s, it was apparent that the Canons
no longer addressed the realities of the practice of law, which not surprisingly
had changed dramatically since 1908. What emerged from the American Bar
Association was the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a three-tiered
codification of overarching ethical principles ("Canons"), minimum standards
of professional conduct ("Disciplinary Rules"), and principles of conduct to
which all lawyers, it was hoped, would voluntarily adhere ("Ethical
Considerations"). In a political and cultural environment more receptive to
the needs of society's underclasses, the new Model Code recognized the legal
profession's responsibility to make legal services available to all Americans.
Still, the ABA restricted advertising to "reputable" law lists that it deigned to
sanction, and otherwise prohibited structures, such as group legal service
plans, that would allow lawyers to make good on their promise to provide
access to justice for all those in need.
The Model Code was not without its deficiencies. It focused almost
exclusively on the professional responsibilities of litigating attorneys, ignoring
the many lawyers who are perfectly happy never to see the inside of a
courtroom. It barely touched on the obligations of lawyers representing
organizational clients, or of those who work in large bureaucratic public and
private firms. Instead, the Code continued to proceed from the outdated
paradigm of the individual lawyer representing an individual client. While
these shortcomings alone may eventually have been sufficient to topple the
Model Code from its throne, a cataclysmic event for the legal profession
precipitated an early fall. That event was the Watergate scandal, in which
lawyers played key roles. It served as the catalyst for a movement to revisit
the standards governing attorney conduct less than a decade after the Model
Code emerged from the ABA halls.
The ABA formed a Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
in 1977. The Commission spent three years studying lawyer ethics and, in
1980, presented a draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Commission urged some far-reaching changes to the nature of the attorneyclient relationship, including rules requiring lawyers to disclose illegal
activities by clients and instituting mandatory pro bono publico service. Many
of the Commission's proposals were rejected by the ABA House of Delegates
during the three years of study and debate that followed.

10.

Id. at 159.
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as ultimately adopted by the
ABA, differed in significant ways from the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Gone was the three-tiered structure and, most notably, any
mention of aspirational standards or "better practice" guidelines. Instead,
black-letter rules for the imposition of discipline were supported by official
commentary." The Model Rules made an effort to address some of the ethical
issues faced by transactional and other non-litigating attorneys, and otherwise
tinkered with some of the ethical precepts that had been in the Model Code.
Essentially, however, the Model Rules, while a step forward in many respects,
did not constitute a fundamental reworking of the profession's ethics rules.
Perhaps as a result, and in direct contrast to the almost immediate and
unanimous acceptance of the Model Code, states proceeded deliberately in
deciding whether to adopt the Model Rules, and a handful of states, such as
New York, rejected the Model Rules outright.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct can perhaps be analogized to
a modest house built in the early 1960s. The kitchen and bathroom were
updated in the late 1970s, and the garage was converted into an extra room,
but otherwise the house has remained unchanged. By the late 1990s, however,
it became apparent that the occupants of the house had - along with their
neighborhood - changed dramatically. The house no longer met their needs.
Clearly, what is needed is for the Commission to build a new house for the
occupants to live in. Instead, the Commission is redecorating.
It has perhaps, then, fallen to the interested bystanders to take the "steps
back" that the Ethics 2000 Commission chose not to take, and to consider
what sort of code of conduct lawyers need today, on the threshold of the Third
Millennium.
The first step back involves a consideration of whether the legal
profession needs a code of ethics at all. As discussed above, the subtext of the
early codes of ethics was an effort by the Brahmins of the Bar to squelch
undesired competition from less privileged lawyers or, worse yet, competition
from those outside the legal profession. 2 While some members of our
profession may continue to view these as valid goals of regulation, the courts
have taught lawyers over the past three decades that codes of ethics cannot be
used for anti-competitive purposes.' 3 Today, the principal purpose served by
a code of lawyer ethics is to prevent lawyers from running roughshod over the

11.
12.
13.

See generally MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Scope Notes (1980).
WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 53-54.
See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433

U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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rights of their clients, the justice system, and the public. Rules are needed to
ensure, among other things, that when hiring counsel clients make an informed
choice, untainted by false or misleading statements, undue influence or duress,
that clients are not gouged for unconscionably exorbitant fees, that lawyers do
not under the banner of loyalty facilitate their clients' frauds or illegal
conduct, and that lawyers maintain the sanctity of information they receive
from their clients. This is necessary to retain our status as a self-regulating
profession, relatively free from the intrusive oversight of politicians and lay
bureaucrats. Likewise, we rein in the aggressive tendencies of attorneys in
order to prop up our profession's public image, which is always fragile and
often besmirched. A code accomplishes these purposes by establishing where
the floor is, for example, by setting minimum standards of conduct below
which lawyers may not fall without risk of losing the privilege of practicing
law or suffering other forms of professional discipline.
A regulatory scheme is needed to establish the parameters of the often
complex relationships among lawyers, between lawyers and their clients,
between lawyers and the courts, and between lawyers and the public. A code
of conduct, however, can and should accomplish more. Much has been said
in recent years about the declining "professionalism" of the bar. An
inherently vague and amorphous term, professionalism means different things
to different people. 4 Perhaps it is as simple as courtesy and civility to other
lawyers, or as basic as the axiom that our obligations to our clients must
always be placed ahead of our self-interest in income generation, or as lofty
as the phrase "officer of the court." No matter what professionalism is, ethics
codes can impel lawyers toward a higher plane of conduct by advising them
that certain actions or inactions, while not So reprehensible as to warrant
professional discipline, are nonetheless unacceptable for members of the bar.
Whether couched as "aspirational standards," expressions of the "better
practice," or otherwise, this second tier of rules helps send a clear message to
lawyers and the public that lawyers take seriously their special role in modern
civilization, and that as among ourselves we do not believe that conduct
falling just this side of the disciplinary line is good enough.
The legal profession lost something important when the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, with its motivational Ethical Considerations, were
supplanted by the sterility of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. By
not even speaking of the existence of a layer of unacceptable conduct above
the bare minima, we effectively told lawyers that they could properly and in

14. See generally Professionalism in Practice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 48; Seth
Rosner, Professionalismand Money, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 69.
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good conscience practice at the margins of propriety, and thereby denigrated
the many statements of bar associations and other leaders of the profession
urging "professionalism." We lost the notion that there is a category of nonsanctionable conduct of which we, as a profession, simply disapprove and will
not accept among our own.
We could hope that for the next century we would make greater efforts
as a profession to restore our own dignity, at least .through the promulgation
of some form of aspirational guideposts. It is apparently not to be.
Even as to the minimum standards expressed in the black letter rules,
much could be done to ready the attorney conduct code for the future. The
Commission is interested chiefly in fine-tuning the Model Rules, filling gaps,
clarifying ambiguities and so on, and is foregoing the opportunity to engage
in a truly comprehensive re-examination of fundamentals of legal ethics. Such
an undertaking could lead to the creation of a code of conduct that is truly
reflective of where the attorney-client relationship and the legal profession is
today and will be in the near future. Much has been said about the future of
the practice of law, and many analyses have been made of the possible courses
the practice may take. The Commission should be re-examining the centuryold principles of legal ethics in light of these changes, some of which are
already taking place. How will lawyers be able to cope with competition from
non-lawyers and multi disciplinary practice groups if they cannot themselves
form affiliations with non-lawyers? Why should lawyers be required to
adhere to a duty of undivided loyalty, when that is no longer a reasonable or
legitimate expectation of clients who themselves balkanize their legal work
among dozens of firms? What must be done to permit lawyers to practice
effectively by making maximum use of the new technologies that their clients
are using, if not developing? Must we continue to shoe-horn our profession
and our relationship with clients, the courts and the public into rules that are,
to a significant extent, protectionist, self-serving and outdated?
There is every reason for the Ethics 2000 Commission to explore these
and other issues that will or are about to confront the legal profession. Indeed,
the Commission has taken some progressive steps in this regard, at least with
respect to specific issues and trends nowhere addressed in the current version
of the Model Rules. Recently added to the Commission's work plan, for
example, are the implications of multi-disciplinary practice groups and the
practice of law over the internet, two trends of immediate significance to the
legal profession. How and whether these issues are resolved by the
Commission, and ultimately by the ABA House of Delegates, remains to be
seen, but the profession will surely benefit from the exercise alone.
Taking another step back, the Ethics 2000 Commission might have
undertaken a re-examination of the basic structure of the Model Rules of
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Professional Conduct. The Model Rules are premised on the fallacy of the
monolithic attorney-client relationship. In an approach at least as old as the
1908 Canons, each rule purports to address an issue for all walks of lawyer,
regardless of the nature of their practice or of the clients they represent.
While the commentary to each rule often diverges and discusses the
application of the basic, black-letter rule in different contexts, the overarching
principle in each case remains the same. Lawyers, however, are not all the
same. While a core of general practitioners remain, specialization is rapidly
increasing. Likewise, lawyers work in a wide variety of practice settings,
from government law offices to large law firms to corporate legal staffs to
storefront offices to legal assistance organizations. Correspondingly, their
clients are very different, with different needs, different expectations, and
different relationships with their lawyers.
Does it make sense to treat all of these lawyers, clients and relationships
the same? While there is a nucleus of common ethical precepts, such as
loyalty, honesty and confidentiality, stemming from the elemental need of a
client to trust his or her lawyer, the same cannot be said for their application.
Is the relationship between a large firm and the Fortune 500 corporation it
serves the same as that between a legal services lawyer and an elderly client
suffering from the early stages of Alzheimers disease? Should prosecuting
attorneys, and perhaps criminal defense attorneys, be freed from the general
restriction on communicating directly with non-party witnesses who are
otherwise represented by their own counsel? The absence of ethical guidance
for lawyers in various practice areas is apparent from even a cursory review
of the literature attempting to fill the gaps left by the monolithic model. 5
This is not to say that each legal specialty should have its own, entirely
separate code of conduct, as some have suggested. 6 Differences among
practice areas and types of clients could be addressed through a "hub and

15. See, e.g., Gwen Thayer Handelman et al., Standards of Lawyer Conduct in
Employee Benefits Practice, 24 J.PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANCE 10 (1998); Nancy B.
Rapoport, OurHouse, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM.
BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 45 (1998); David Hricik, The 1998 Mass Tort Symposium: Legal Ethical
Issues at the Cutting Edge of Substantive and ProceduralLaw, 17 REV. LmG. 419 (1998);
Malini Majumdar, Ethics in the InternationalArena: The Need for Clarification,8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 439 (1995).
16. See Stanley Sporkin, Commentary, The Needfor Separate Codes of Professional
Conductfor the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993) (remarking if we are
going to improve our standards substantially we are going to need enhanced ethical standards);
see also Mark H. Aultman, Commentary, Response to Judge Sporkin, Cracking Codes, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 735 (1994); Steve France, Commentary, Response to Judge Sporkin, Unhappy
Pioneers: S&L Lawyers Discover a "New World" of Liability, 7 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 725
(1994).
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spokes" structure, in which core ethical principles would be set forth,
followed by subsidiary rules applicable only in particular contexts or practice
settings. Rules that have been revealed as unworkable, unnecessary or
anachronistic in various contexts could be tightened or relaxed, as necessary,
to address the particular needs of the concerned parties.
Taking yet a final step back, the Commission might have considered
whether the basic structure of attorney regulation in the United States
continues to make sense. While the practice of law is becoming multijurisdictional, the regulatory structure for the legal profession is not.
Regulation of the conduct of attorneys has traditionally been the province of
the states, which admit attorneys to practice, adopt rules for their conduct, and
discipline them for violation of those rules. 7 Although the scope of the
practice of law has become increasingly nationwide, if not worldwide, with
some lawyers routinely handling matters outside of their states of admission,"
there has been no substantial movement toward a national system of attorney
regulation. Thus, each state and the District of Columbia has adopted its own
set of rules of attorney conduct. It is fair to say that despite the American Bar
Association's continual efforts at standardization, the various jurisdictions
have adopted dozens of different sets of ethics rules.
As a consequence, the entire structure of attorney regulation in the
United States is Balkanized. 9 Uniformity of governing standards could be
achieved if attorney admission, regulation and discipline were controlled, or
at least coordinated, on a nationwide basis. Whether uniformity is necessary
or even desirable, and how to achieve it, could have been yet another topic
undertaken by the Ethics 2000 Commission.
The best time to prepare for the future is before it arrives. Ethics 2000
provided us with an opportunity to establish a direction for the legal
profession before our ability to control our own destiny is supplanted by

17. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,442 (1979) ("[s]ince the founding of the Republic,
the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States").
18. The parochialism with which some state courts have viewed the interstate practice
of law is perhaps best evidenced by the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998),
which held that a New York law firm could not recover fees owed for work performed in
California because it was not authorized to practice law in that state. Most of the preparatory
work for acontemplated arbitration had been conducted in California, where the client's offices
were located; the matter was settled before hearings commenced. In rejecting the firm's claim
for fees, the court stated: "Although we are aware of the interstate nature of modem law
practice and mindful of the reality that large firms often conduct activities and serve clients in
several states, we do not believe these facts excuse large firms from complying with
[California's unauthorized practice of law statute]." 949 P.2d at 2.

19.

The term "Balkanized" as used means anything but uniform.
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market forces and other extrinsic factors. It appears, however, that Ethics
2000 will not work any revolutionary changes in the way we look at legal
ethics, but will continue the slow, reactive evolution process that has
historically brought about subtle changes in standards of attorney conduct.

